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Exploring Mapping:  
Discussions with Swati Chattopadhyay and Derek Gregory 
 
Swati Chattopadhyay is Professor and Chair of the Department of the History of 
Art and Architecture at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She is an 
architect and architectural historian specializing in modern architecture and 
urbanism and the cultural landscape of British colonialism. 
 
disClosure Interviewers: Sarah Soliman and Erin Newell 
 
DC: The theme for the series this year is mapping, and we were wondering how 
this theme is broadly addressed in your work. It is something that came up quite 
frequently in the pieces we read for today to prepare for your visit, but more 
broadly, how do you see mapping in your work? 
 
SC: You know maps are representations—and there has been a long history of 
scholarship on that—maps are about power. And I’m using the term power in a 
very broad sense: power in the sense of something being political. Doesn’t matter 
if it’s a microscale of power, it has political repercussion. Maps have a long 
history. They go back to the ancient world. But the kinds of maps I have looked at 
in my work (I’m thinking about the eighteenth century onwards) were cadastral 
surveys, surveys of estates, agricultural lands; they could be maps of roads; they 
could be maps of revenue surveys; they could be route surveys for military 
reconnaissance. There were various kinds of surveys and maps on a regional 
scale. But there were also city maps. And interestingly, when the scale gets 
reduced, we start calling them plans. We don’t call them maps anymore. We call 
them site plans, neighborhood plans; we don’t say neighborhood maps because it 
comes to the scale of what is conventionally understood as architectural scale. So 
maps, broadly speaking, are a set of scalar representations. This means you are 
reducing a scale; there is no 1:1 map unless it’s the fabulous Borgesian map. 
Things get excluded, so one must chose what to include, and the choices—that’s 
where the politics reside. What are the choices? How do you choose? What is 
your method? There is no objective map, there cannot be, because you are making 
actual choices, and there are some choices that become conventional because 
they’ve been agreed upon. For example, look at this room. If you had to draw a 
plan of this room, there is a conventional way to drawing this plan. But you could 
do unconventional plans. For example, if you were not tutored in how to draw a 
plan, you would not do it “correctly,” right? As an architect would or draftsman 
would. But you would draw a plan, plan-like, some representation, which would 
describe your cognition of the space. Maps are also about cognition. It’s about 
how you perceive space. That’s when you move it from the technical aspect of it 




and get back to how you perceive space. Even the technically “correct” ones are 
about perception. So, as somebody trained in architecture and [who] works on 
architecture, what I find interesting in the work of a lot of architectural historians 
is that plans have become so conventional that the basis of their representations 
are not questioned. You don’t seek an explanation of “Why do I have to draw this 
plan like that?” Because it’s this long habit basically, disciplinary habit. So I’ve 
looked at why, let’s say, Calcutta city maps looked like what they did. They 
didn’t have to be like that. It was about some power struggle. As I will explain 
today, I’m making a distinction between maps and mapping—maps as artifacts 
and mapping as process. What are some other ways of thinking about space? 
Maps are a way of thinking about representing space. So how do we get out of the 
conventions, or the conventional trappings and the power trappings of maps that 
presume a positivist view—that there is a world and I’m representing it. It’s not 
like that. 
 
DC: We wanted to shift gears to some of your current projects, and then maybe 
go back to talk about your other pieces. Your current project on nature’s 
infrastructure—could you comment a little more on that, and also whether the 
differences between rural and urban play into that project at all? You talk about 
urbanism in the city, but we were wondering if the rural comes in at all in your 
current project. 
 
SC: The rural comes into cities whether you want it or not because it is part of 
city life. Rural spaces are implicated within the heart of the city—its laborers, its 
construction materials. So there is no way of separating that. My current project, 
the major research project that I have launched, is what I call “The Making of the 
Gangetic Plains.” The Gangetic Plains and the damming of the rivers, the 
hydroelectric plants, created major havoc in the landscape. And that’s the work of 
ecologists, people who are experts in hydrology and geography. What I’m 
interested in really is the process through which the plains were mapped, and I’m 
talking about major cartographic projects, and how that was connected to the 
canal building, the agricultural revenue, the dam-making, the railways, because 
the Ganges provides a framework for those infrastructural undertakings. So I want 
to understand how these got connected, and what kind of attitude towards the 
plains that demonstrates in terms of a territory: a war landscape (because the first 
maps were for military reconnaissance); it’s use as agricultural land (which is 
related to revenue); the revenue surveys that were conducted; and the building of 
canals and the failure (repeated failures) to build the canals (and there is a long 
history of that as well). Every time a major project would be launched, it would 
spawn another infrastructure. For example, a bungalow would be built, an office 
would be built, and there would be a network of these stretching out over the 
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plains. So what we take to be the “natural” plains was every inch built. But it 
would struggle with the natural forces, if you will. It almost appears that the 
plains have an agency of their own. And it is formidable. So, I’m looking at that 
and I’m starting in the seventeenth century, looking at the plains from the 
inception of the British Empire.  
 
DC: That actually leads really well into our next question—we are curious about 
the influence of your architecture background. Part of it is that you are able to get 
past the dominant infrastructure of the city, or the rural, or what we would 
normally conceive as “natural landscape,” and to look beyond that to see how 
space is constructed. But we were wondering how else your architecture 
background changes how you see what you work on and impacts your research. 
Why did you begin to look at the world in that way? What prompted you to do 
that? 
 
SC: I think my architecture background comes in very handy when doing spatial 
analysis. Let me give you an example. When I draw analytic diagrams, that’s a 
particular way of reading the landscape. There is nothing obvious or taken for 
granted about them. They are not illustrations, they are analytical, which means 
you need to be able to read connections between spaces. The spatial savvy to see 
those connections—I think that is helped by my architecture training.  
 
DC: You can be confident in what you think you know. 
 
SC: I think that’s my strength in terms of being a historian. I think the way I 
analyze the space and I produce the diagrams and drawings, that’s a method in 
itself. Everybody doesn’t need to do that, but I find that it not only explains, it’s a 
probe into issues. Charles Correa, an Indian architect, said there’s a reason why 
Mahatma Gandhi was called the architect of the nation and not the physicist of the 
nation or dentist of the nation; it’s because what architects do is take various 
[kinds of] expertise and put them all together. They can see the whole. They are 
the authors of a project in which they can see the viability of the connections. I 
take that to heart. I think that’s what a good architect does. Being an architect is 
not one particular expertise; it’s being able to put together various visions, various 
ideas, various methods into a manageable entity, whether it’s a whole or not. 
Something that can be executed. 
 
DC: Are there any particular architectural spaces that interest you? 
 
SC: All architectural spaces interest me, but the scholars I learned from made a 
clear distinction between elite spaces and folk/vernacular spaces. I’m not sure I 




find the distinction terribly useful, but I can use that vernacular method to look at 
any space. You can do that to the palace in Versailles. What needs to be different 
for architectural history or cultural geography is to propose a different way of 
looking. So, sure, you can ask different questions about Versailles as opposed to, 
let’s say, the building we are sitting in. And you do, but you can also not get 
bogged down by architectural intentions, the intents of the architect and the 
patron, because that’s how we understand Versailles. This is what Louis XIV 
wanted. This is what his architects wanted. Chandra Mukerji has a very good 
book about the gardens of Versailles—Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of 
Versailles. And that’s one way of thinking about those gardens. They were not 
just beautiful, choreographed spaces. They were war-like. They were a 
microcosm of the French state and its war ambitions. Similarly, one could, 
theoretically speaking, look at Versailles from the perspective of the laboring 
population. What would that history look like?  
 
DC: Continuing with this idea of the relationship among binaries, I want to go 
back to the rural/urban divide for a moment. The urban seems to me to be a 
privileged category, at least in analysis in the academy, and I think much of your 
work also calls for a different vocabulary of the city. How do you suggest we 
think about the city and this trope of the urban/rural divide? 
 
SC: The urban/rural divide exists because there’s a refusal to accept that much of 
what is urban is deeply implicated by the rural, and vice-versa. I do not launch a 
project of planetary urbanism because it continues to perceive the urban as the 
creative dynamic force. That’s the crucible—the urban is the crucible where 
change is happening, and that is deeply lodged in social theory, from Marx to 
Raymond Williams. Marxist tradition is replete with it. Raymond Williams’ 
critique was not quite able to get beyond this theoretical frame. The last chapter of 
Raymond Williams’ The Country and the City does talk about the difficulty of 
accepting that cities are the places of change; at the time he was writing, he saw 
change happening in China and Cuba—change was happening in rural areas. He 
was critiquing the idea that rural areas are always backwaters (Marx’s famous 
phrase, “the idiocy of the rural”). But that English history is very different from 
the history of the urban/rural relationship in the rest of the world—most of the 
world. Despite the impact of the urban, rural areas have far more autonomy and 
are far more powerful. I’m not quite there to say we need to launch a project of 
planetary urbanism. Perhaps one could argue in the same breath a project of 
planetary ruralism. Why choose urbanism? I have difficulty with accepting that as 
an a priori. 
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DC: I was intrigued by your “Core and Periphery” piece because you frame [the 
urban rural binary] as core and periphery or even just city and periphery instead of 
urban and rural. The core isn’t necessarily what’s in the center and the periphery 
isn’t necessarily the outside, but it’s also how we assign value to things, so it isn’t 
just a spatial relation. 
 
SC: I’m an urbanist myself—there is a presumption that cities are the 
“happening” places. It’s possible to see the relationships in these complicated 
terms, and nothing seems inevitable along this divide or relationship. The reason 
I’m interested in this—and it’s something I kind of left out of my first book—is 
that rural India was launched as the site of the new nation. It was not the city. 
Despite the fact that much of the rural imagination was city-centric, it was rural 
India. It is rural India that needed to be mobilized. It was very apparent that urban 
protest, urban revolution, would not do it. It was a simple demographic fact that 
most of the people lived in the villages. It’s a dominating fact. This was Gandhi’s 
success: he could mobilize. He taught that this was the way. He recognized that 
you have to mobilize rural India to win this game; otherwise, it’s not going to 
happen. It’s a very compelling argument, and what Raymond Williams 
recognized. Why in Cuba was it the rural? Why in China was it the rural? Why 
was the rural mobilized? Cities tended to be elite spaces—they tended to be 
conservative spaces. There just wasn’t enough reason for things to change. They 
were benefiting from this situation. Why change? Even now I would say, much 
happens in cities, but change has to happen. It has to come from somewhere else, 
not the cities. 
 
DC: You always hear that the urban is privileged, but that change is going to 
come from cities.  
 
SC: I think the rural has to be re-thought drastically. Think of cities—we think of 
America as so urbanized, right? Most of the territory is still rural. How much are 
they affected by urban and capitalist practices? And what’s your measure? For 
me, the terms have gotten too tired—the urban and the rural. They need to be 
energized. We need to do something new with them, otherwise we fall back on a 
priori assumptions. 
 
DC: I was really interested in your use of the uncanny in “Cities and Peripheries.” 
Could you talk a bit more about the uncanny and particularly the ecological 
uncanny? 
 
SC: I came upon the idea of the uncanny when looking at the representations of 
colonial landscape and the anxiety of representation I could decipher in them. I’m 




using the idea of the uncanny as a kind of analytic for parsing through these 
representations because, as I explained in Representing Calcutta, the conflict 
between wanting a home in India, wanting a landscape to be familiar when it can 
never be familiar, produced different reactions among different people. Some 
people really wanted to assert that the home in India be an exact replication of the 
one in England, against formidable obstacles. Others wanted to see India as an 
escape from those sorts of bonds of home, if you will. And when they saw the 
familiar in the landscape, that was disabling. I needed a way to explain that, and I 
thought the uncanny really helped me there. In my more recent work, I’m starting 
to mobilize the idea of the ecological uncanny to speak of anxieties about 
landscape, but also at other times appearing without prior notice. If you will, 
ghost-like. Like you didn’t know there was a ghost landscape here. You didn’t 
expect it. And an unexpected return: you thought it was dead and quite buried, 
and suddenly it crops up. I think the uncanny allows one way of thinking of the 
simultaneity of past and present—to explain the moments when the two appear at 
the same time. 
 
Derek Gregory is the Peter Wall Distinguished Professor and Professor of 
Geography at the University of British Columbia. He is interested in the spatial 
modalities of late modern war, where military violence, occupation and peace 
bleed into one another.  
 
disClosure Interviewers: Austin Crane, Sophie Strosberg, and Marita Murphy 
 
DC: We are familiar with your training as a historical geographer, but also your 
work has critically addressed cultural and political imaginations and their spatial 
relationships to violence in a way that’s been influential in terms of present 
events, and the understanding of those in critical human geography. We’ve 
noticed that you employ a method that toggles from past to present and back 
again, to address the injustices of our present condition. Could you explain your 
purpose in this methodology? 
 
DG: That’s a good question. Some of it, I think, is pure instinct. Having been 
trained as a historical geographer, then I suppose I approach the present as 
something which is about to become the past right now. But I do think that it’s 
immensely dangerous to flatter ourselves into believing that we live in this brave 
new world where everything is novel, and we are the first people to encounter this 
sort of thought. More than that, I think it’s important to situate what’s happening 
now within a much longer, not necessarily continuous, series of trajectories in 
order to better understand the sequences of change that have taken place. I also 
think that there are times in which the contrast between past and present, or more 
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often the continuities, can be remarkably illuminating. The last reason for doing it 
is that, as I have said, I think it’s important to approach the present unfettered by 
these sub-disciplinary categories and pursue problems wherever they take us.  
The last thing I should say is that I’ve always admired the writing of really good 
historians, and for that matter historical geographers, and I think that’s in stark 
contrast to much of what I see across the social sciences, including human 
geography. I think that, even allowing for the critiques of narrative, the fact that 
there is a narrative force in so much historical writing is one of the reasons that it 
captures the imagination of an audience beyond the academy.  
 
DC: Now, maps have obviously created a bridge from past to present as well. 
This year we’re looking at mapping as the theme for the Committee on Social 
Theory. There’s a long and violent history of how the military and mapping have 
driven one another forward, and we were wondering how the theme of mapping is 
present in your own work, explicitly or implicitly. 
 
DG: It’s present. It’s present in all kinds of ways. It’s present of course because 
the history of cartography is intimately bound up with military power and military 
violence, particularly exercised through the name of the sovereign. So it’s no 
accident that in Britain, the state mapping agency was known as the Ordnance 
Survey. But of course, mapping was bound up with military power long before 
the nineteenth century. 
In my own work, I think there are two crucial ways in which mapping 
becomes important. The first is that I’ve been trying to think through the way in 
which modern war depends upon the performance of particular spaces. I identify 
three in particular: the space of the target, the space of the enemy other, and the 
space of the exception. If we focus on the space of target, then it’s clear that 
modern war depends on turning a rich, complex, diverse landscape, a landscape 
which is full of life, into the abstract space of the target. Maps are an essential 
means for doing that. It’s a process of abstraction which is in one sense scientific 
(or at least it purports to be scientific). In other words it turns the world into an 
object world in which weapons can be directed against, well, until very recently, 
objects: military bases, rocket launchers, missile batteries. And much more 
recently, of course, a mapping which is focused on the movement of individuals 
in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, so that the targets become people, but 
nonetheless still very largely abstract entities. But it’s not a purely scientific 
exercise; it’s also a rhetorical one. Because the more you can turn this 
complicated landscape into the abstract space of the target—the map, with its grid 
lines, its references, its coordinates, a screen of pixels even—the more, in a sense, 
you are distanced from the effects of the violence themselves. I think the modern 




kill-chain has become ever more dispersed, ever more subdivided, and that whole 
process of abstraction is, I think, driven by a series of mappings.  
But there’s a second way that mapping has come into my work much more 
recently, which is what I’m going to talk about this afternoon. That’s to say that 
when we look at, in the case that is captivating me at the moment, the First World 
War, it’s very clear that on the western front, the apparent stasis of trench warfare 
was brought about not by the fixity of the map at all, but by a series of advances 
and counter-advances which depended upon, in fact were choreographed by, a 
constantly updating map basis. That is to say, maps were constantly redrawn, 
overprinted, and distributed. Aircraft were taking photographs, which were 
distributed at all command levels on a weekly and, eventually, a daily basis. And 
when you get right down the front lines, soldiers were updating these maps 
themselves, copying them, sketching them, and amending them. So there is this 
tremendous sense of a map in motion—which is precisely what enables the 
trenches to stay where they are. Because if you don’t know what the enemy are 
doing, then they will overwhelm you, and the stalemate is produced partly 
through that vector of geographical intelligence.  
Yet, when you read the soldier’s accounts on the Western Front, many of 
them clearly don’t see this in purely cartographic terms at all. They certainly don’t 
see it in the optical/visual terms of the map or the aerial photograph. Their 
knowledge of the battle field is of a battle field—not of a space, not of a 
geometry—which they know through their bodies, they know it through sound, 
they know it through touch, senses which are very different from those which are 
mobilized in conventional mapping. 
 
DC: So it seems like there’s a really concrete interplay between the geographic 
imagination and the form of representation or the technologies of representation.  
 
DG: Yes, that’s right, because in very many ways, these are never just 
representations, of course. They have very real consequences. The fact that the 
general is far removed from the front lines at general headquarters, for example, 
at Montreuil—the only way he can know what’s happening is to plot it on a map, 
to look at a photo-mosaic. Until he visits the front lines, or until his staff officers 
visit the front lines, there’s a sense in which those abstractions produce a 
remarkably abstract view of the war itself.  
There’s a memorable anecdote which I’d like to think is true, which is, in 
the early days of the war, the Royal Flying Corps were up in the air trying to 
provide real time intelligence about the German advance. They would land, and 
their reports would be rushed to headquarters. The British commander is supposed 
to have said: “How can I follow through on my plans when you keep bringing me 
all these bloody Germans?”  
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That’s really the point, you see, that those abstractions produce a very 
particular kind of war. It’s an increasingly precise, geometric clockwork 
mechanical war in which everything is supposed to play out perfectly on the map. 
But of course, on the battlefield, it’s not like that at all. Equally, the 
representations that the front-line troops produce emerge out of their direct 
experience of the war, but in turn shape that experience. So there’s a continuity 
that you can’t really pull out. The trench map which is being exhibited back at 
headquarters or the annotated scruffy copy that’s being changed and had mud 
splashed all over it in the front line trench—you can’t pull either out of the milieu 
in which they are being produced, and used, and activated. 
 
DC: We read on your blog earlier this week that the purpose of today’s talk at 
Kentucky is “to explore a dialectic between cartography and […] corpography.” 
Two questions: first of all, does the term “corpography” refer to corpus as in body 
or corpse as in dead body? That’s a clarifying question. Then, second, your work 
considers the lives, deaths, and imaginations of individuals caught up in 
geopolitical processes like the “War on Terror,” or “the kill-chain.” Why is it 
important for you to address corpography in your work on large-scale issues of 
war and violence?  
 
DG: Well in a way, you answered your question yourself. Corpography is 
obviously a made-up word. And it goes right back to what I was saying about the 
First World War—that cartography imposes this optical, visual clarity on the 
world and, in fact, the inspiration, or at least the spur, for the talk this afternoon is 
a wonderful remark in a novel by William Boyd called An Ice-Cream War, which 
concerns the First World War but in German East Africa. There’s an 
extraordinary scene in which a young subaltern, Gabriel, is on board a troop ship 
and the whole campaign is being planned out on a map. But when Gabriel and his 
troops splash ashore, they encounter a radically different world—a world that he 
can make no sense of, that doesn’t seem to conform to the map. Boyd writes, 
“Gabriel thought maps should be banned, they gave the world an order and a 
reasonableness it didn’t possess.”  
I’ve always been haunted by that phase, so what I want to do this 
afternoon is explore it. Now the cartographic vision that I’m talking about is of 
course not confined to the map, conventional or otherwise. Cartographic vision in 
the cases that I’m going to be talking about extends far beyond that to aerial 
photography and to field sketching, for example. All of these are modes of 
military apprehension which focus very much on abstraction, on simplification, 
and on a certain clarity of reason which is supposed, of course, to translate into a 
clarity of purpose and of execution.  




Corpography, by contrast, is that much more haptic view of the world. 
Now the best discussion of that that I know is a brilliant book by Santanu Das 
called Touch and Intimacy in First World War Literature, which talks about these 
haptic geographies—knowing the world through the body. As I’ve been reading 
the diaries and the letters and the memoirs—not just of the soldier-poets, but of 
ordinary, front-line soldiers—it became clear to me that the world that I was 
searching for to contrast with the cleanliness of cartography, had to be 
corpography. Partly because it conveys that sense of the corporeal—the way in 
which, for example, in the Somme you live in mud, mud is the medium through 
which you fight. Everything is encased and caked in it, and your knowledge of 
what lies within the trench or beyond the trench in no man’s land—well of course 
it’s partially visual—but it’s profoundly sensual, physical, and comes through the 
experience of this muck that you’re slopping around in. Das calls it a 
“slimescape” and I think that conveys really what I want to get at.  
But the reason I mention slimescape is that Das and others make it quite 
clear that Somme mud is not just mud. It’s composed of all the debris of industrial 
and industrialized killing. So it includes ammunition, barbed wire, spent shell 
cases. But of course it also includes body parts. So, for me, corpography is not 
simply about the corporeal but it’s also about the corpses, which, in a sense, make 
the killing field a field.  
 
DC: Your recent work employs terms such as “the everywhere war,” as we’ve 
been talking about, “killing from a distance,” “global borderlands,” and “the kill-
chain.” How does your work explicitly consider the spatiality of bombing and war 
today, getting into the more explicitly geographical aspects? 
 
DG: Well, if we think about the spatiality of war, more generally, I suppose I’m 
interested in several questions: The first is the “where” of “the everywhere war.” I 
think it important to understand, in the most elemental, empirical sense, the 
geographies of military violence that are unfolding on the planet today. Secondly, 
I’m interested in the capacity of modern militaries to wage war over a distance. 
And I’m interested in that in a whole series of different registers. So, how is it that 
when a state goes to war, it’s able to produce military intelligence so that it knows 
something of the terrain over which it’s going to be fighting, the enemy that it’s 
going to be up against? Then logistically, how is it going to get its troops, its 
supplies, and everything else that’s needed to a distant theater? And then the 
whole question of the weapons themselves, and their range, and the production of 
what I earlier called “the space of the target.” And in all of those registers, there 
are ways in which your mapping question comes to the fore.  
But the third way in which I am interested in all of this is through these 
performances of space. So not thinking simply about where military violence is 
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quite literally taking place, not thinking simply about how you get the means of 
military violence to engage peoples and places over a distance. But military 
violence does produce those three spaces: the space of the target, the space of the 
enemy other, and the space of the exception. And there too, spatiality is written 
into the conduct of war. So I don’t want to limit my understanding of war to the 
map, for all of the reasons that I’ve given you. Because, obviously, concepts of 
space and spatiality reach far beyond the narrowly cartographic.  
 
